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Like most academics, we law professors pride ourselves on being able to 
think out of the box—to escape established or conventional trains of thought, to 
provide deep and unusual insights, and to develop theoretical perspectives in 
powerful ways that end up transforming the law for the betterment of society. 
I would venture to say that many of those who seek academic positions or 
tenure at top law schools virtually take it for granted that they are expected to 
aspire to scholarship that exhibits some of these attributes. This professional 
success norm (for lack of a better term) may be one reason for complaints like 
those of Chief Justice Roberts, who bemoaned the irrelevance of much of what 
law professors write;1 academics who compete with one another to be further 
out of the box are at risk of becoming completely superfl uous.
This essay is a defense of in-the-box thinking in legal scholarship. A small 
but growing movement of private law scholars has put forward an approach 
variously called “pragmatic conceptualism,”2 “new private law,”3 or “the new 
doctrinalism.”4 We advocate the importance of serious doctrinal analysis 
within the perspective occupied by the common law. The approach is, in 
important respects, both theoretical and doctrinal. It aims to absorb the work 
of multidisciplinary legal scholars rather than rejecting it. Nonetheless, new 
1. See Law Prof. Ifi ll Challenges Chief Justice Roberts’ Take on Academic Scholarship, ACS BLOG (July 4, 2011), 
http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/law-prof-ifi ll-challenges-chief-justice-roberts%E2%80%99-
take-on-academic-scholarship (quoting Chief Justice Roberts as saying “Pic k up a copy of 
any law review that you see and the fi rst article is likely to be, you know, the infl uence of 
Immanuel Kant on evidentiary approaches in 18th-century Bulgaria, or something, which 
I’m sure was of great interest to the academic that wrote it, but isn’t of much help to the 
bar.”).
2. Benjamin C. Zipursky, Pragmatic Conceptualism, 6 LEGAL THEORY 457 (2000).
3. John C.P. Goldberg, Introduction: Pragmatism and Private Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1640 (2012).
4. Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Constraint of Legal Doctrine, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1843, 1857 (2015).
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private law theorists—myself included—have often treated twentieth-century 
legal realists as their antagonists. It is worth saying a few words about why.
Legal realism has many strands, and it was of course fi rst developed in part to 
make legal scholarship more useful by adding valuable knowledge from within 
the social sciences. At least one broad theme within legal realism, however, was 
far more negative and critical. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., the grandfather of 
the jurisprudential movement, believed that the language of the common law 
needed to be washed with “cynical acid.”5 Anticipating not only legal realism, 
but whole movements in the philosophy of language and the philosophy of 
science (which fall under the rubric “verifi cationism”6), Holmes insisted on a 
reductive approach to the statements about whether a given legal right or legal 
duty existed: “[A] legal duty so called is nothing but a prediction that if a man 
does or omits certain things he will be made to suff er in this or that way by 
judgment of the court; and so of a legal right.”7 On this view, statements about 
law are not only illuminated by empirical claims about human behavior, they are 
actually constituted by such empirical claims. Holmes was saying that—at least 
within the common law (which does not rely upon legislative commands)—to 
say that some legal duty exists is actually to make an empirical claim about 
how various legal actors (e.g., courts) are likely to behave.
The critical and reductive edge of legal realism was pushed much further in 
the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s by the critical legal studies movement and law and 
economics alike.8 The reason is straightforward: To the degree that the meaning 
of legal words and concepts is deemed indeterminate and manipulable, it 
appears both at best pointless and at worst fraudulent for professors to claim 
to have found answers to legal problems in the terms of the law itself. And to 
the degree that legal statements are really about human behavior, expertise 
in law should come from expertise in the sciences of human behavior—
social science, including economics. In this way, those who want to make a 
worthwhile contribution to legal scholarship are moved to think outside of the 
terms of the law itself—outside of the box.
From my concededly armchair vantage point, what I called the “professional 
success norm” has combined with the ascent of a critical form of legal realism 
to form a legal academic culture in which doctrinal legal scholarship has been 
treated as intrinsically second rate. Like the professional success norm, the 
infl ux of Ph.D. economists, historians, philosophers (of which I am one), and 
political science professors over the past few decades has been both a product 
5. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 458, 462 (1897).
6. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral of MacPherson, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 
1733, 1733 (1998) (describing aspects of Holmes’s views that resemble verifi cationism). See 
generally Rudolf Carnap, The Rejection of Metaphysics, in PHILOSOPHY AND LOGICAL SYNTAX 9 
(1935) (putting forward verifi cationist criterion of meaning, and rejecting metaphysics and 
ethics as meaningless).
7. Holmes, supra note 5, at 461.
8. See Goldberg, supra note 3 (displaying connection among American legal realism, critical 
legal studies, and law and economics).
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and a cause of the move away from scholarly doctrinal analysis. Add to this 
the struggle of law schools for respect within the universities, and one begins 
to see how in-the-box legal analysis might have fallen from grace as a form of 
serious scholarship.
While there is much to be said for interdisciplinary legal scholarship and 
for out-of-the-box legal thinking—indeed, they are part of the legal academy’s 
critical role—this is hardly all there is for a law professor to write or to think 
about. Assertions of doctrinal indeterminacy by realists and their academic 
descendants tend to be wildly overinfl ated, and the foundation of such 
jurisprudential views has been subjected to unrelenting criticism.9 I shall 
suggest below that doctrinal scholarship—in-the-box thinking in law by legal 
academics—also has a vital critical role to play.
I want to illustrate my point by focusing on an example of law professors 
failing to provide “in-the-box” analysis of an important legal issue.10 In 1996, 
Congress included in its Communications Decency Act (“CDA”) a provision 
that protects some defendants from liability for defamatory statements on 
the Internet.11 In my view, courts have almost uniformly misinterpreted the 
scope of the CDA as eliminating libel law’s republication rule12 and thereby 
dramatically reducing liability for defamation that happens to occur through 
the Internet. This error, I believe, stems largely from a failure to take legal 
doctrine seriously. Despite a barrage of law review literature on CDA § 230,13 
no one seems to have pointed out that CDA § 230 actually has nothing to do 
with the republication rule.
Jones v. Dirty World Entertainment Recordings LLC14 is representative of how 
Internet defamation law is now understood by a range of legal actors. The 
principal defendant in that case was Nik Richie, the owner and operator of 
the website thedirty.com.15 Members of the public are invited and encouraged 
to send him nasty and pornographic statements and pictures about private 
9. Most famously, in H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2d ed. 1994).
10. I provide a more in-depth account of how courts have misunderstood the protection 
off ered by the Communications Decency Act in Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Monsanto Lecture: 
Online Defamation, Legal Concepts, and the Good Samaritan, 50 VALPARAISO L. REV. __ (2016) 
(forthcoming).
11. Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-104, 110 Stat. 137 (codifi ed as amended at 
47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012)). 
12. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 578 (AM. L. INST. 1977) (“Except as to those who only 
deliver or transmit defamation published by a third person, one who repeats or otherwise 
republishes defamatory matter is subject to liability as if he had originally published it”); 
Flowers v. Carville, 310 F.3d 1118, 1128 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying republication rule).
13. See sources cited at Center for Law and Information Policy at Fordham Law School, Section 230 
of the Communications Decency Act: A Survey of the Legal Literature and Reform Proposals 22-35 (April 25 
2012) (surveying scholarly literature critical of CDA 230).
14. Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398 (6th Cir. 2014).
15. Id. at 401.
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individuals.16 Richie selects among them and then posts some prominently 
on his website, typically adding some kind of commentary.17 The website, 
like many others of this nature, has been very popular. The plaintiff  was a 
major league football cheerleader who sued Richie and the LLC owner of the 
website because of statements that she had a venereal disease and that she had 
slept with every single member of the Cincinnati Bengals.18 The District Court 
rejected Richie’s argument that he was protected by the CDA, reasoning that 
Richie’s soliciting of (and commenting upon) materials disqualifi ed him from 
statutory immunity as a neutral republisher of the contributor’s defamatory 
posting.19
Following the great majority of courts, the Sixth Circuit ruled that the key 
question was whether Richie’s additions were themselves defamatory in an 
independent way; after answering this in the negative, the court ruled that 
Richie’s CDA defense warranted summary judgment for the defendant.20 
Richie’s website is but one example of a massive online industry that is 
profoundly misogynistic and invasive of women’s ordinary lives—an industry 
that is now regarded as largely beyond regulation.21
A tacit premise of the Sixth Circuit’s entire analysis was that—under 
the CDA—Richie could not be held liable for the simple reposting of his 
contributors’ defamatory statements. In this, the Sixth Circuit followed the 
Ninth Circuit,22 the California Supreme Court,23 and the New York Court 
of Appeals.24 All of them have derived this conclusion from the following 
statutory text in § 230(c): “No provider or user of an interactive computer 
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information 
provided by another information content provider.”25 Richie was the user 
of an interactive computer service provider, and imposing liability on him 
for posting his anonymous submitter’s posts would be treating him as the 
publisher of information provided by another content provider. Although a 
number of early commentators were undaunted by this statutory language,26 
courts have almost uniformly adhered to it over the past fi fteen years. Even 
16. Id. at 402-03.
17. Id. at 403. 
18. Id.
19. Id. at 405; Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings, LLC, 840 F. Supp.2d 1008, 1010–13 (E.D. 
Ky. 2012).
20. Jones, 755 F.3d at 1415. 
21. DANIELLE CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE (2014).
22. Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003).
23. Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510 (Cal. 2006).
24. Shiamili v. Real Estate Grp. of N.Y., Inc., 952 N.E.2d 1011 (N.Y. 2011).
25. Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2012).
26. See, e.g., Susan Freiwald, Comparative Institutional Analysis in Cyberspace: the Case of Intermediary 
Liability for Defamation, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 569. 591 (2001).
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commentators hostile to the CDA today seem to acquiesce in this reading, and 
therefore call for amendment of the statute.27
Having taught libel law for more than twenty years, having read the case 
law, having seen how other legal systems treat Internet libel, and having 
closely examined the history of CDA § 230, I fi nd it stunning that CDA § 
230 has been so interpreted—often by widely admired judges. In my view, this 
is a blunder. The principal point of CDA § 230 was to protect online service 
providers like AOL from liability for being a passive conduit or for failure to 
remove defamatory postings by others.28 The common law of libel contains a 
potentially aggressive edge that was rightly perceived, in the early 1990s, to 
have the potentiality to wreak havoc on Internet service providers by forcing 
upon them liability for failure to remove third parties’ defamatory postings, 
or perhaps even liability for being a conduit of defamatory postings. Because 
the problem was not just limited to actual Internet service providers, but 
to bulletin board operators, website owners, and others, Congress inserted 
broader language “no provider or user of an interactive computer service.”29
In uncontroverted and explicit legislative history, Congress indicated that 
there was a particular case that triggered great concern—Stratton Oakmont v. 
Prodigy.30 In a legal environment full of uncertainty over whether ISPs would 
face liability for serving as conduits of defamatory statements or for failure 
to remove them, a New York trial judge ruled that since the ISP Prodigy 
expressly undertook to engage in censorship and fi ltering, it should indeed 
be held responsible for defamatory postings that appeared through its service, 
even if it did not itself post them.31 The online service industry went ballistic, 
and told Congress both that: (a) trying to monitor everything others posted 
at peril of liability was unreasonable, and risked a problem of overcensorship; 
and (b) selectively imposing liability on those ISPs that undertook to censor 
for families was doubly misguided, because it would remove the incentive to 
make good-faith eff orts to monitor for obscenity.32
Congress expressly accepted both arguments,33 and crafted CDA § 230 in 
response. Section 230(c)’s fi rst subsection essentially says that what someone 
27. See, e.g., CITRON, supra note 21. 
28. I defend this claim at greater length below. See also Zipursky, supra note 10.
29. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
30. See H.R. CONF. REP. 104-458, H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 458, 104TH Cong., 2ND Sess., 1996 
WL 46795, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10 (Leg.Hist.) **124, ** 207-08, P.L. 104-104 (stating that “one 
of the specifi c purposes of this section is to overrule” Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy 
Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nassau Co. 1995)).
31. 1995 WL 323710, at *6. 
32. See 141 Cong. Rec. H8460-01 (1995) (testimony of Rep. Chris Cox).
33. See supra note 30; see also Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997). (describing 
legislative history).
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else posted about a plaintiff  cannot be the basis for liability for an Internet 
service provider.34 Its second section says that volunteering in good faith to 
censor or fi lter cannot be a basis for imposing liability, either.35 The big picture 
is that no one is going to face liability for being a passive conduit or for failure 
to remove.
The CDA’s title—it is literally labeled a “good Samaritan” statute36—clues 
us in to the fact that we should view it in terms of the good Samaritans we 
teach students about in fi rst-year torts, and the “good Samaritan” statutes 
every state has passed to protect such persons.37 Recall how such statutes work. 
Negligence law has broad nonfeasance doctrine that says there is no affi  rmative 
duty to protect or rescue others from potential harm generated by a third party 
(or nature). A qualifi cation built into the common law of torts is that those 
who undertake to rescue or protect the plaintiff  do have an affi  rmative duty 
and will face liability for failing to use reasonable care to comply with that 
duty. Concerned that physicians or medical personnel or laypersons will be 
discouraged by this legal structure from volunteering to help persons injured 
in emergencies on the road, states have passed “good Samaritan” statutes that 
alter the common law rule by saying that such undertakings will not trigger 
negligence liability, so long as the volunteer (good Samaritan) acted in good 
faith.
Congress was clearly aiming to fi x what it saw as a parallel problem. Drawing 
from its experience with Stratton Oakmont and an earlier New York case from the 
Southern District of New York (Cubby v. Compuserve38), Congress envisioned a 
state whose tort law: (a) treated ISPs and ISP users as having no affi  rmative 
duties to protect others’ reputations from the harmful postings of third parties; 
but (b) imposed an affi  rmative duty on those ISPs that undertook to protect 
third parties by censoring and fi ltering obscene or defamatory materials. The 
clearest point of the CDA is that a state may not impose an affi  rmative duty upon 
those who undertake to protect others’ reputations in this manner. CDA 
§ 230(c)(2) quite plainly says that those who undertake to censor and fi lter 
voluntarily shall be protected as good Samaritans:
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on 
account of—
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or avail-
ability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, 
lascivious, fi lthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, 
whether or not such material is constitutionally protected; or
34. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
35. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2).
36. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c). The full title of this subsection is “Protection for ‘Good Samaritan’ 
blocking and screening of off ensive material.”
37. DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, THE LAW OF TORTS § 312 (2d ed. 
2011).
38. Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
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(B) any action taken to enable or make available to information content 
providers or others the technical means to restrict access to material described 
in paragraph (1).39
As in fi rst-year torts, that means that defendants shall not be treated as 
acquiring affi  rmative duties to remove defamatory postings merely by virtue 
of a good-faith eff ort to protect others.
Although § 230(c) interpretation is somewhat more diffi  cult when we look 
at its fi rst section, it is nevertheless fairly clear in context. Here is how it reads:
(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as 
the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information 
content provider.40
Think again of Stratton Oakmont. The New York court treated Stratton Oakmont 
as a publisher of the statements that a third party posted on a bulletin board 
through Prodigy: it held that Stratton Oakmont could be held liable as if 
it had published the statements (in the traditional sense), by virtue of the 
fact that Prodigy was the medium through which the statements appeared, 
and by virtue of the fact that Prodigy (and the individual whom Prodigy 
hired to monitor the website) had the capacity to remove it.41 CDA § 230(c)
(1) essentially forbids courts from doing this. It makes sense that this section 
precedes the one that plainly contains a version of a good Samaritan rule, for it 
lays down a basic rule stating that ISPs (and others) do not have responsibility 
for protecting persons against the publications by others through the ISP. This 
is analogous to laying down a basic rule in negligence law for emergencies, 
that there is no duty to protect others from outside harm. Then subsection (2) 
of § 230(c) says the rule is not altered by an undertaking to protect, so long as 
there is good faith.42
Appellate courts today have completely missed this reading.43 Under the 
withering arguments of a talented First Amendment defense bar, they have 
read this section to eliminate a basic rule of defamation law—the republication 
rule.44 This rule says that defendants who take something someone else told 
them and restate it in published words or disseminate it widely cannot take 
shelter in the fact that they were just quoting someone else or repeating what 
they said.45 The reasons for the republication rule are obvious. Not only is 
republication a voluntary act itself, and not only does it amplify the damage 
39. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2).
40. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
41. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710, at *6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nassau 
Co. 1995).
42. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A) (“any action voluntarily taken in good faith”).
43. See, e.g., Barrett, supra note 23, at 513-14 (overlooking any basis for active/passive distinction).
44. 1 RODNEY A SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 4:87 (2d ed. 2001).
45. Id.
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to an extraordinary degree, it is also one of many “I wasn’t born yesterday” 
principles in our legal system—for we know that the world of defamers will 
typically fi nd a way to make their damaging statements by putting the words 
in someone else’s mouth. Common law, statutory law, and constitutional law 
have all found ways of trimming the edges of the republication rule for certain 
important contexts (e.g., a newspaper reporting what town council members 
actually said at a public meeting).46 But the core of the rule remains intact 
throughout American defamation law, except in the case of the Internet, where 
§ 230(c) has been used to battle against it.
There is simply no evidence (other than this misreading of the text) that 
Congress intended to get rid of the republication rule, and doing so would 
have been quite bizarre. Imagine that a private detective maliciously emailed 
the board of directors of an ISP that the company’s CFO was a rapist, and 
the ISP chose to post the malicious email on its website, knowing it was false. 
Under the republication rule reading of CDA § 230(c)(1), there is no liability. 
Creating such a policy has nothing whatsoever to do with Stratton Oakmont 
or the monitoring fears that Congress expressly placed in the statute. The 
problem in that case was essentially the very opposite: ISPs and users were 
being held liable for failure to remove or censor something, as if they had 
actually posted it themselves. CDA § 230 prohibited courts from equating the 
passive-conduit or would-be censor role with the role of someone who actually 
published the statement.
My basic point about CDA § 230 is this: A distinction exists between 
eliminating affi  rmative duties to remove content and limiting conduit liability 
for ISPs and those working with them, on the one hand, and eliminating the 
republication rule for the Internet, on the other. Amazingly, I have not located 
a single legal commentator who has made this point.
CDA § 230 is but one example of cases in which courts have been left in the 
dark on challenging questions in the law of torts.47 Getting real in all of these 
cases means coming to understand how the law works—thinking well in the box, 
not just out of the box. The box is not value-free and it is not impermeable, 
but there is nonetheless a lot to know about what is in it and how to use it. 
And—as I hope my Internet libel example illustrated—it makes a diff erence 
in the real world whether the law is or is not well-understood in these terms. 
Defamation law aims to protect people against a variety of wrongs, and 
a misreading of CDA § 230 has shorn away much of that protection, while 
simultaneously fostering a profoundly misogynistic medium in the Internet. 
Judges and lawyers are moving in the wrong direction on CDA interpretation 
not (or not only) because they do not see the policy consequences or because they evaluate these 
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 611 (“Report of Offi  cial Proceedings or Public 
Meeting”).
47. Cf. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse Defended: A Reply to Posner, 
Calabresi, Rustad, Chamallas, and Robinette, 88 IND. L. REV. 569, 579, 585-91(2013) (describing 
array of doctrinal problems to which pragmatic conceptualist methodology and civil 
recourse theory have been applied, and claiming more such analysis is necessary).
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consequences diff erently. They are doing so at least in part because they do not have 
a big enough, deep enough, and well-considered enough picture of this area of 
the law. In my view, it is our job (the job of legal academics) to help to remedy 
that problem.
Finally, it must be admitted that there is an intrinsic appeal to what I have 
called “out-of-the-box” thinking, which “in-the-box” thinking appears to lack. 
Law is the product of establishment forces, for the most part, and the authority 
of the legal system tends to infl ate not only the effi  cacy of norms that become 
enacted or adopted into formal, enforceable law, but also their apparent legitimacy. 
We law professors tend to be proud of our capacity to challenge authority and 
question legitimacy, and, as well-educated persons with secure jobs and plenty 
of legal sophistication, we are well-placed to do so. Sticking to the analysis of 
doctrine may seem to be squandering the opportunity to question authority, 
or, worse still, abdicating a form of responsibility.
The outside, critical perspective is motivated in part by the fear that courts 
will fall into a pattern of enforcing unjustifi able legal norms simply because 
they are there, without questioning whether they should be there or how they 
should be changed. This is a valid concern, but it is not the only valid concern. 
Another concern is that the words and concepts that supposedly constitute 
the law are mere window dressing—that there is no real substance or content 
in the law, but simply verbiage to be used one way or the other, covering a 
highly disjointed set of possible cases. We academics reinforce that concern 
when we ignore the value of doctrinal scholarship. If part of integrity as a legal 
scholar is coming to grips with the normative defensibility of the law (or its 
indefensibility), that is not the only part. Another part is coming to grips with 
the breadth and complexity of law’s content. Without taking seriously what 
the law says, when carefully and thoughtfully understood, we are giving up on 
the idea that the law can genuinely guide conduct and guide the resolution of 
disputes, and without this, we are giving up on law’s central aspiration.
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